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COASEAN MARKETS 
(revised, August 2010) 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
This paper explores some features of markets as they are presented in the work 
of Ronald Coase, focusing mainly on “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) and “The 
Nature of the Firm” (1937).  The “market” that appears in Social Cost is different from 
the market that usually appears in neoclassical economics.  A neoclassical market 
consists of all goods that are sufficiently similar in customer perception and location that 
their traders compete with one another and the trades gravitate toward the same price.  
Although a neoclassical market may have thousands of sellers and buyers only two are 
needed to complete a trade.  In the ordinary case other market participants are not 
affected except insofar as they have lost the opportunity to engage in that particular 
trade themselves.  For example, the market for potatoes may contain thousands of 
sellers and buyers, but a trade will occur when one seller accepts an offer made by one 
buyer.  For all other participants in the potato market, business goes on. 
In a Coasean market, by contrast, much smaller groups of people or firms are 
locked into a trading relationship by some prior commitment, typically an investment in a 
particular location or product.  All participants have a common interest in this investment 
and a satisfactory trade will not occur unless all of them agree.  This shift in focus has 
had important consequences for Coase’s analysis, as explored below.  First, Coasean 
markets are typically much smaller than neoclassical markets.  Indeed, larger Coasean 
markets may not work very well.  Second, this focus on very small markets became a 
defining characteristic of a new brand of “institutionalism” that was largely inimical to the 
institutionalism that it replaced.  Third, the unanimity requirement tends to make 
Coasean markets less stable as the number of traders increases beyond two. 
Coase’s work and that of his followers led to a new form of “institutionalism” 
acceptable within mainstream economics, although it was largely unfavorable to the 
thought of the earlier institutionalists.  Coase replaced the eclectic, historical, 
evolutionary and behaviorist approach of the old institutionalists with greater formalism 
and more of the rigor of marginalist analysis.  In the process, however, Coase assumed 
away important issues that the first generation of institutionalists were trying to address 
and created some new ones, such as how equilibrium is to be attained in Coasean as 
opposed to neoclassical markets.  The equilibrium problem is substantial but its 
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significance has not been sufficiently developed in either the theoretical or the empirical 
literature.  As a result, Coasean analysis of the business firm has made much more 
progress than has Cosean analysis of markets for legal entitlements, which were the 
subject of the Social Cost essay.  Further, the superiority of private governance over 
legislation that many of Coase’s followers have advocated loses much of its force as the 
number of participants in Coasean markets increases beyond two.  Coase himself 
recognized this problem but never developed its consequences. (Coase, 1959, 29) 
The first portion of this paper explains that Coasean “institutionalism” does not 
refer to any affinity Coase may have had for the institutionalists’ views about the state 
and the economy.  He appears to have been unaware of their existence in 1937, and he 
was unimpressed with what he learned about them later.  Rather, Coasean 
institutionalism refers to Coase’s focus on very small markets, something he shared 
with the first generation of institutionalists only coincidentally.  This focus on small 
markets greatly influenced modern transaction cost economics, with its concerns about 
such things as vertical contracting and agency costs.  Indeed, the Coasean market, 
which shows up mainly in “The Problem of Social Cost,” has precisely the same 
boundaries as those that Coase identified with the business firm in his celebrated 1937 
article.  The second portion of this paper then examines some important differences 
between the hierarchies in the Coasean firm and the trading among free bargainers that 
characterizes Coasean markets.  Unanimity is required for Coasean markets to 
function, and this requirement can create unstable outcomes as the number of 
participants increases beyond two.  This fact has different implications for the Coasean 
market, which relies on voluntary trading, and the hierarchical relationships that 
characterize the business  firm. 
Coasean Institutionalism 
 Ronald Coase is widely recognized as a founder of the modern law and 
economics movement (E.g., Posner, 2003, p. 23).  He is also said to be a founding 
contributor to the field of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1989, 1979), which is 
part of what is sometimes called the “new institutional economics” (North, 1981, 1982; 
Furobotn and Richter, 2d ed. 2005, p. 369;  Williamson and Winter, 1993).  
“Institutionalism” historically refers to a group of American economists including 
Thorstein Veblen, John Maurice Clark, Wesley C. Mitchell, Richard T. Ely, John R. 
Commons, Clarence Ayres, and Adolph Berle, among others, who wrote from the late 
nineteenth century into the 1930s and beyond.  This first generation of institutionalists 
was very diverse and resists classification, but they agreed in their opposition to the 
excessive abstractionism that they perceived in neoclassical economics, as well as its 
failure to take evolution and behaviorism into account (Hodgson, 2004; Medema,1996; 
Hovenkamp, 2010b).  The institutionalists believed that human-created institutions such 
as the business firm or the common law system of property rights were improperly 
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overlooked or underemphasized in neoclassical economic analysis, mainly because of 
marginalism’s powerful but highly abstract conception of the market, and its emphasis 
on exchange as the only mechanism for moving resources from one place to another. 
Unlike neoclassicists, the first generation of institutionalists generally preferred a 
historical rather than purely analytic approach to the study of economic behavior.  As a 
group they were heavily historicist (Ross, 1990, pp.410-415), and many were influenced 
by the German Historical School (Ross, 1990; Richter, 1996).  Their work emphasized 
the extent to which institutions originated and evolved in order to meet human 
biological, psychological, and social needs, and to consolidate power and transmit 
hierarchy.   To be sure, markets remained important but the institutionalists tended to 
believe that market exchange  accounted for a much smaller portion of the economy 
than the neoclassicists thought.  Further, the institutionalists necessarily focused on 
much smaller and more idiosyncratic economic relationships, including business firms, 
tribes, families, labor unions, and the like.  They observed that the working rules 
developed by many small associations moved a great many resources through society, 
and generally through devices other than market transactions (North, 1981, p. 5; 
Polanyi, 1944, pp. 45-69). 
In making this criticism the institutionalists ignored, rejected or downplayed many 
of the most fundamental principles of neoclassical economics.  Most, although not all, 
either rejected or severely qualified the use of marginal analysis.  As a theory of social 
economic ordering, marginalism had come to see exchange as virtually the only 
scientifically justifiable mechanism for moving resources through society, except in 
relatively rare cases of market failure.  This was a proposition that institutionalists 
almost uniformly rejected.  Some institutionalists, such as Veblen, disputed that 
marginalism was a coherent and useful theory of value at all (Veblen, 1909).  Others, 
such as John Maurice Clark and John R. Commons, used marginal analysis extensively 
but tended to subordinate it to other types of concerns.  (Clark, 1923; Commons,1924)  
Still others, such as Berle and Means, studied the law and economics of the business 
firm without doing marginal analysis, notwithstanding that an important neoclassical 
literature on the firm already existed by the time they wrote (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Hovenkamp,  2010a; Hovenkamp, 2010b). 
For most institutionalists the principal objection to marginalism was that it was too 
reductionist as a theory about how both individuals and society make economic choices.  
By and large the marginalists were unconcerned about the source of utility preferences 
and not interested in the reasons that people assert the preferences that they do.  
Rather, they accepted preferences as given, insisting only that they be rational in the 
minimal sense that they are transitive.   By contrast, the first generation of 
institutionalists tended to be either Darwinian or behaviorist in their theory of value 
(Hodgson, 2004; Hovenkamp, 2010b).   They believed that preferences have biological 
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origins and that they are driven by responses to scarcity.  As a result, within a species 
and a given environment preferences tended to be similar from one organism to another 
and can be compared.  They can also be ranked in the sense that one can distinguish 
“survival” needs from “surplus.”  Further, evolutionary psychological and social 
development determined when individuals organize themselves together into institutions 
and when they choose to go alone. 
These differing ideas about the nature of economic preference indicate another 
area where the first generation of institutionalists took sharp issue with neoclassical 
economics.  This was the neoclassical embrace and the institutionalist rejection of 
ordinalism, or the idea that interpersonal comparisons of utility are technically 
impossible and thus lie outside the boundaries of economic science.  The first 
generation of institutionalists tended to share with the early marginalists the notion that 
the state could improve welfare by transferring resources away from those who had 
more and toward those who had relatively less.  In that case the government would be 
transforming less valuable surplus into much more valuable survival needs (Cooter & 
Rappaport, 1984).  In contrast, ordinalism was the view expressed by Lionel Robbins in 
the 1930s that economics is nothing more than the science of studying choice under 
scarcity, and that no scientific test exists for determining whether a particular preference 
is more valuable to one person than to another (Robbins, 1932, 2d ed.1935; Robbins, 
1938; see Hovenkamp, 1990c). 
Ordinalism turned neoclassicism’s traditional focus on market exchange rather 
than involuntary wealth transfers into a largely exclusive concern.  Under its constraints 
the only movements of resources that could be said to improve welfare were the 
preference orderings of the individual economic actor and the results of free exchange.  
Involuntary transfers of wealth and nonmarket movements of resources generally could 
not be evaluated for welfare effects because economics was thought not to provide the 
tools for ascertaining whether the gains enjoyed by recipients outweighed the losses 
experienced by the involuntary donors.  Under ordinalism this was typically thought to 
be true even though the transfers away from the wealthy deprived them only of surplus, 
while the transfers toward the poor involved basic survival needs (Cooter & Rappaport, 
1984).  The only exceptions were technical corrections for market failures such as 
natural monopoly or the provision of public goods. 
In sharp contrast to ordinalism’s hostility toward state wealth redistribution, 
institutionalism in the United States became the economic basis for Legal Realism and 
the New Deal in American politics.  The result was the rise of the welfare state, with its 
robust belief that the sovereign could increase welfare by moving resources legislatively 
rather than through market exchange (Hovenkamp, 2010b; Barber, 1994) 
August, 2010 Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets    Page 5 
Whatever Coase himself may have intended, Coase’s article on The Nature of 
the Firm is widely read today as a kind of synthesis of institutionalist and marginalist  
thought (Medema, 1996, 1997; Hovenkamp, 2010b).  Coase himself believed that his 
essay was an exercise in marginal analysis.  He wrote in his introduction that he 
intended to evaluate the business firm by “two of the most powerful instruments of 
economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of 
substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.” (Coase, 1937, pp. 
386-387).   The Nature of the Firm contains very little of the empirical observation that 
Coase himself later claimed to be so important to his type of study (Coase, 1991, 1998; 
1974).1  Rather, Coase argued that the use of the market imposes costs.  He referred to 
these mainly as “marketing” costs, or as costs of using the price mechanism, rather than 
the later term “transaction costs.  Coase argued that “the main reason why it is 
profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism.” (1937, p. 390).  In Coase’s idea of the firm managers continuously 
compare the incremental costs and payoffs of internal production (expansion or vertical 
integration) against external procurement, chosing whichever alternative provides the 
best payoff until the two are equalized at the margin.  For example, Coase conjectured: 
…[I]nventions will change both the costs of organizing and the costs of using the 
price mechanism.  In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms 
larger or smaller will depend on the relative effects on these two sets of costs.  
For instance, if the telephone reduces the costs of using the price mechanism 
more than it reduces the costs of organizing, then it will have the effect of 
reducing the size of the firm.” (1937, p. 397 n. 3). 
When The Nature of the Firm was published in 1937 institutionalism was already 
in decline, although its most provocative writings on the business firm were well 
established in the economic literature. These included Veblen’s Absentee Ownership 
(1923); Commons’ Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924), and Berle and Means’ 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).  Coase did not discuss or even cite 
any of them.  At the time he may not even have been aware of some of them.  Nothing 
in The Nature of the Firm nor his later writings about that article suggests that he was in 
any way influenced by their ideas (Coase, 1937, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). 
For all the talk about Coase as an institutionalist several things should stand out.  
First, he almost never cited any of the recognized institutionalist economists.2  Second, 
                                            
1 For a rejoinder to Coase’s call for more empirical work in his famous piece on The Lighthouse in 
Economics (Coase, 1974), see Bertrand (2006). 
2 The authors coming closest to being institutionalist that Coase cited in The Nature of the Firm were 
Frank Knight  (1921) and Friedrich von Hayek (1933). 
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his thought enthusiastically rejected every one of the central tenets of institutionalism 
described above.  Third, in his later writings he treated the institutionalists very harshly 
(Medema, 1996)  Coase has always been mainly a marginalist with very little interest in 
“getting behind” the assertion of preferences in order to discern their biological, 
evolutionary, behaviorist, or other sources.  Further, he has demonstrated considerable 
impatience for the view that government intervention via involuntary transfers of 
resources can increase welfare.  Indeed, The Problem of Social Cost was written in 
large part as a critique of Cambridge University economist Arthur Cecil Pigou’s 
arguments for government intervention (Pigou, 4th ed. 1932).  Finally, Coase has never 
exhibited much interest in either historicism or behaviorism as devices for explaining or 
accounting for economic decision making. 
So how is it that Coase’s work today is so closely identified with institutionalism 
that it is claimed to be the foundation for a “New Institutional Economics”? (e.g., 
Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985)  The one premise Coase shared with the 
institutionalists is that the study of small economic markets or market substitutes is 
important.  Neoclassicism, with its highly abstract and rationalized theory of marginal 
substitution, tended to assume that all economic actors are alike, or that their 
differences are unmeasurable unless recognized through exchange.  They had no 
theory of institutions as such.  But neoclassical assumptions gave a very poor 
accounting of why human beings, the only real economic actors, organize themselves 
as they do, and why they form institutions whose working rules often redeploy resources 
by means other than mutual exchange (see, e.g., Ostrom, 1990, 2005). 
Coase’s essay on The Nature of the Firm is sometimes thought to have opened 
up the “black box” that had been the business firm under the Marshallian neoclassical 
approach to economics.   In the very forceful marginalist analysis of Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics (1890) the business firm was presented very abstractly as an 
“economic actor” or “production function,” with scant attention to the determinants of its 
size or structure or the details of its behavior (Robbins, 1928; Stigler,1990).  The result 
was an impoverished theory about why firms grow to the size they do, and what 
determines the degree and nature of vertical integration. 
Although the critique that neoclassicism did not have a meaningful theory of the 
firm contains some truth, the field was hardly barren (Hovenkamp, 2010a, 2010b).  In 
the late 1910s Alfred Marshall himself wrote a detailed study of the workings of 
business firms, certainly not as elegant as Coase’s but more empirical (Marshall, 1919).  
In 1923 American economist John Maurice Clark published a remarkable book showing 
how firms with substantial fixed costs make pricing decisions, and debunking the view 
that deviations from perfect competition such as price discrimination have monopoly 
explanations.  In fact, the use and social impact of price discrimination depends on cost 
characteristics that are very specific to the firm and have little to do with monopoly 
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(Clark, 1923).  In the late 1920s Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, Arthur Cecil Pigou, 
wrote an important essay on the equilibrium firm, using marginal analysis to explain 
when a firm would expand and when it would contract by comparing the firm’s marginal 
cost curve to the industry supply curve (Pigou, 1928).  In 1934 Nicholas Kaldor followed 
with his own theory of the equilibrium firm, which related optimal firm size to increasing 
supply costs within a manufacturing facility (Kaldor, 1934).  Then, in 1931 and 1934 
Cambridge economist E.A.G. Robinson published The Structure of Competitive Industry 
and “The Problem of Management and the Size of the Firm,” which partially anticipated 
Coase’s view that the size of firms was driven by the relative cost of management as 
opposed to use of the market (Robinson, 1931, 1934; see also Jacobsen, 2008).   
Robinson argued that the size of firms was highly sensitive to the skills of managers in 
organizing internal production cheaply.  He noted Kaldor’s argument that the production 
costs of a plant rise as its output increases, placing a limit on plant size.  But that fact 
alone did not explain why the firm could not grow larger simply by operating multiple 
plants.  The real limit to firm growth, Robinson argued, was increasing costs of 
management, which necessarily overlay the totality of a firm’s various production 
facilities.  Market costs tended to remain constant and were invariant to firm size, while 
managerial costs tended to rise.  As a result, management costs imposed a limit on the 
size of firms.  Coase cited Robinson for this proposition (Coase, 1937, p. 397). 
On the other side, the institutionalists had also made important contributions 
concerning the effects of the separation of ownership and control in the business 
corporation (Veblen, 1923; Berle and Means, 1932) and also to the study of how 
hierarchical relationships within the firm contrasted with market relationships outside 
(Commons, 1924).  Coase’s work did not attempt to bridge these two bodies of 
literature.  Rather, its approach was aligned almost completely with that of the 
marginalists and made no mention of the possibly divergent interests of shareholders 
and managers or of specific hierarchies that are internal to the firm, other than a few 
brief references to the law of master and servant (Coase, 1937, p. 404-405). 
While both the later marginalists and the institutionalists criticized the Marshallian 
conception of the firm for being a “black box,” their critiques were very different from one 
another.  The marginalist critique of the Marshallian firm faulted it for not taking apart 
the separate functions of the firm in a way that showed how the firm would maximize its 
value.   Clark’s study of fixed costs (Clark, 1923), Pigou’s and Kaldor’s studies of the 
equilibrium firm (Pigou, 1928; Kaldor, 1934), and Robinson’s studies of management 
costs (Robinson, 1931, 1934) all addressed this shortcoming.  They applied purely 
marginalist analysis to ask questions about when a firm could profitably increase its 
output or what would be a profit-maximizing output strategy in the presence of fixed 
costs.  These insights were powerful, and in their own way they were just as 
fundamental to our understanding of the business firm as Coase’s were to be. 
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By contrast, the institutionalists took the business firm apart for a very different 
purpose.  They wanted to expose its social irresponsibility, internal inefficiencies and 
greed, the dereliction of duty of managers who were not owners, and its abuses of 
power.  Interestingly, John Maurice Clark was as much an institutionalist as he was a 
marginalist, and he wrote powerful books on both subjects (Clark, 1926, 1923). 
In an important sense the institutionalists looked inside the corporate black box in 
a way that Coase’s analysis did not.  Coase, in common with the neoclassicists, simply 
assumed that firms relentlessly maximize the value of individual choices, and their 
boundaries identify the line of marginal equality between the costs of external 
procurement and internal production.  The institutionalists, by contrast, refused to 
accept maximization at the margin as an analytic starting point, assumed that firms 
often fail to maximize, and then set out to discover why.  Berle and Means Modern 
Corporation spawned a large literature both inside and outside of neoclassicism on the 
subject of agency costs, or the equivalent of transaction costs but within the various 
hierarchies of the firm.  This literature has served to give Berle and Means continued 
relevance even within transaction cost economics, and to focus one part of economic 
thinking on the internal workings of the firm (e.g., Williamson, 1996, pp. 172-176; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 3  
Both neoclassicists and institutionalists saw the separation of ownership and 
control as a defining characteristic of business firms, but they had completely 
antagonistic views about impact.  For neoclassicists the separation of ownership and 
control was essential to the business firm’s mission, which was maximization of its own 
value.   Already at the beginning of the century Yale economist Irving Fisher had offered 
his “separation theorem,” which showed that the business firm’s profit function could not 
be derived from the utility functions of its diverse shareholders (Fisher, 1906, 1907, 
1930).  As a result, inquiries about how the business firm seeks to maximize its value 
need not be troubled about the possibly diverse preferences of their owners.  In good 
neoclassical tradition, the shareholder as a distinct entity never appears in The Nature 
of the Firm, which treats the only relevant decisions as the ones made by managers.  
This trend would continue in neoclassical theory of the firm until ownership questions 
became entirely irrelevant to the formal analysis of business firm behavior, except to the 
extent they produced agency cost problems (Hovenkamp, 2009a). 
By contrast, institutionalists saw the separation of ownership and control as the 
root of the corporation problem, indicating why business corporations would not act in 
the public interest (Berle and Means, 1932).  The working rules of institutions tended to 
                                            
3 This is true notwithstanding Williamson’s later critique that Berle and Means got the study of corporate 
governance and decision making off on the wrong foot.  See Williamson, 2009. 
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show a great deal of hierarchy and power rather than the equality and freedom claimed 
by neoclassicism’s highly generalized vision of markets (Commons, 1924; Hale, 1923).  
Ultimately this institutionalist thinking provided the rationale for the federal regulation of 
corporate securities that emerged in the United States in the 1930s (Berle and Means, 
1932; Hovenkamp, 1991a, pp. 349-364; Hawley, 1966, pp. 300-315).  None of this, 
including Berle and Means’ own book published five years earlier, claimed Coase’s 
attention in 1937. 
Coase tended to see both firms and markets as comprised of actors with a 
common set of interests in value maximization, and whose boundaries and decisions 
are defined by transaction costs.  In The Nature of the Firm the comparative costs of the 
price mechanism, as Coase put it, explained its size and shape.  Does it produce its 
own raw materials or buy them on the open market?  Does it provide its own energy by 
building and operating an electrical or hydraulic plant, or does it purchase electricity on 
the market?  Does it do its own legal work or procure legal services from an outside law 
firm?  The aggregation of many thousands of decisions such as these, ranging from the 
large to the trivial, gives us a picture of both the size of the firm and the extent of its 
vertical integration into upstream or downstream areas.  The firm’s “boundaries” are 
located at the precise point where the marginal cost of inside production and outside 
procurement are in equipoise.  Coasean markets, of which more later, do largely the 
same thing.  First, the size of a Coasean market, which can be much smaller than a 
traditional neoclassical market, is determined by identifying a set of actors with an 
established position and common interests in some entitlement.  The market boundary 
is determined by identifying the line of equality between the cost of moving out and the 
cost of reaching a satisfactory bargain within.  Second, the consequence of successful 
bargaining is to maximize the aggregate value of this market’s participants. 
Transaction Costs and Equlibrium in Coasean Markets 
Costs of Movement v. Transaction Costs 
 In his Nobel Prize acceptance lecture Coase explained his concept of transaction 
costs and its relevance to the legal system: 
If we move from a regime of zero transactions costs to one of positive 
transactions costs, what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of 
the legal system. . . .  I explained in "The Problem of Social Cost" that what are 
traded on the market are not, as is often supposed by economists, physical 
entities but the rights to perform certain actions and the rights which individuals 
possess are established by the legal system.  While we can imagine in the 
hypothetical world of zero transactions costs that the parties to an exchange 
would negotiate to change any provision of the law which prevents them from 
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taking whatever steps are required to increase the value of production, in the real 
world of positive transactions costs, such a procedure would be extremely costly, 
and would make unprofitable, even where it was allowed, a great deal of such 
contracting around the law.  Because of this, the rights which individuals 
possess, with their duties and privileges, will be, to a large extent, what the law 
determines.  As a result, the legal system will have a profound effect on the 
working of the economic system and may in certain respect be said to control it. 
(Coase, 1991). 
Coase did not originate the idea of including the costs of moving resources from 
one place to another in economic analysis.  Arthur Cecil Pigou, Coase’s older 
contemporary at Cambridge, objected to the cost-free, frictionless exchange models 
that had been characteristic of neoclassical economics (Hovenkamp, 2009b), and there 
were others as well (Barzel and Kochin, 1992).  For example, in 1935 John Hicks spoke 
of the “friction” involved in the “cost of transferring assets from one form to another.” 
(Hicks, 1935). 
But Pigou elaborated on these “costs of movement” at considerable length in The 
Economics of Welfare, stating: 
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a unit of resources 
can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an annual charge of n shillings for 
every year during which a unit that is moved continues in productive work in its 
new home. In these circumstances the national dividend will be increased by the 
movement of resources from A to B, so long as the annual value of the marginal 
social net product at B exceeds that at A by more than n shillings; and it will be 
injured by any movement of resources which occurs after the excess of the value 
of the marginal social net product at B has been reduced below n shillings. 
(Pigou, 1932, pt. II, ch. 3, § 3). 
From this observation Pigou developed the idea that improvements in welfare are 
not inherently the normative goal of the economic system.  Rather, the goal should be 
cost justified improvements.  Even though welfare is greater when resources are moved 
from point A to point B, that movement benefits society only if the cost of moving the 
resources is less than the increment in value: 
… when the costs of movement between A and B are equivalent to n shillings, 
the national dividend is best served by the maintenance of the existing 
distribution, whatever that may be, provided that this distribution does not involve 
a divergence in the values of marginal social net products greater than n 
shillings; and, if the existing distribution does involve a divergence greater than n 
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shillings, by a new distribution brought about by the transference of sufficient 
resources to bring the divergence down to n shillings.  
(Pigou, 1932, pt. II, ch. 3, §3). 
 Pigou did not limit these costs of movement to transaction costs.  Rather, they 
included payments “to various agents in the capital market, promoters, financing 
syndicates, investment trusts, solicitors, bankers, and others.”  (PIGOU, 1932, pt. II, Ch. 
7, §1; see also Aslanbeigui and Medema, 1998; DeSerpa, 1993 
 One important difference between Pigou’s conception of the costs of moving 
resources and Coase’s narrower conception of “transaction costs” is that Pigou 
intellectually preceded the ordinalist revolution in neoclassical economics described 
above, while Coase followed it..  Pigou believed that up to a point cardinal utilities could 
be compared from one person to another.   As a result, certain involuntary movements 
of resources, such as taxes on the wealthy to provide benefits for the poor, could be 
said to increase welfare even though they would not ever have occurred by contracting 
mechanisms alone.  Pigou wrote in the fourth and final edition of The Economics of 
Welfare in 1932: 
It is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a 
relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants 
to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate 
sum of satisfaction. The old "law of diminishing utility" thus leads securely to the 
proposition: Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the 
hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the 
national dividend from any point of view, will in general, increase economic 
welfare. (Pigou, 1932, p. 89). 
Once marginalist  economics accepted ordinalist constraints as a fundamental 
principle of economic science, however, only two kinds of resource movements could 
be said to be welfare enhancing.  First, are the internal preference orderings of a single 
economic actor, whether a natural person or a business firm.  Even if interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are impossible, every actor necessarily ranks his own utilities.  
Thus, for example, the individual who quits her job in order to go to school, or the 
business firm who shifts a production facility from shoes to gloves has presumably done 
so because the actor anticipates a payoff that will exceed the costs of movement.  
Second are resources that are moved as a consequence of voluntary exchanges, which 
are always Pareto superior. (E.g., Little, 1950).  If economics relaxes ordinalist 
constraints and accepts that some involuntary wealth transfers are welfare enhancing, 
as did most institutionalists and also the British marginalists from Jevons through Joan 
Robinson, then the Coasean “transaction cost” analysis loses a great deal of its force.  
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More Pigouvian notions about the broader set of costs of resource movement take on 
greatly increased importance. 
 Even under ordinalist constraints, however, transaction cost economics does not 
make other kinds of costs irrelevant.  Production, distribution and the redeployment of 
resources are always costly, quite aside from the costs of transacting.  Indeed, the 
Coasean analysis of the firm makes sense only if a much wider range of costs are 
included.  The Coasean business firm continuously examines and re-examines the 
choices between internal production and external procurement by looking at the 
marginal cost of using the market.  But as compared to what?  If internal reallocation 
were costless while markets were costly, then firms would grow without limit.  Even for a 
single firm determining its own range and scale of operation the costs of movement “writ 
large,” in the Pigouvian sense play an essential role.  For example, suppose an 
automobile manufacturer is considering whether to manufacture its own steering wheels 
or to purchase them on the market.  Perhaps it must construct a new plant for this 
purpose.  Perhaps there is an existing plant, formerly used for some other purpose but 
now sitting vacant, and it could at some cost be re-outfitted for steering wheel 
manufacture. 
No firm limits its consideration to the transaction costs of using the market.  
Rather, it considers the full range of costs of redeploying resources.  Consider Coase’s 
own, previously cited example of the telephone.  The addition of telephones might tend 
to make firms smaller because telephones might reduce the costs of using the market 
while they were likely to have less effect on the costs of internal production.  (Coase, 
1937, p. 397 n.3).  But of course the impact would depend substantially on what the firm 
had to begin with.  A firm deciding whether to make or buy its steering wheels might see 
telephones as reducing the costs of purchasing them, but these might not be sufficient 
to enable the firm profitably to extract itself from a steering wheel plant already in place 
and producing.  On the other hand, it might have a decisive impact on the decision 
whether to change currently unused space into a steering wheel manufacturing facility.  
As Coase noted, the relevant question is where the line of marginal value must be 
drawn, and this is a function both of what one wants and what one already has, as it is 
for all economic actors (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975).  One of the great insights of the 
new institutional economics, or so-called “transaction cost economics,” was that the 
range of relevant costs in determining how and with whom a business must bargain 
consists of much more than the cost of transacting.4  It also includes the cost of prior 
investment from which extraction is costly.  For example, if two firms are so close to 
each other in physical or product that they are each other’s best trading partners the 
                                            
4 For example, Williamson (1996, pp. 124-126) notes the role of sunk costs, which are “incurred in 
advance of the contemplated exchange” and have a “greatly reduced” value “in alternative uses.” 
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cost of switching away is not merely a matter of transactions but of actual resource 
redeployment  (Klein, Crawford, etc, 1978;  Hovenkamp, 2010c). 
 The term “transaction costs” was very likely first used by Tibor Scitovsky in 1940 
to speak about alternative mechanisms for financing the firm (Scitovsky, 1940; Hardt, 
2009; Klaes, 2000).  But the term entered the literature much more prominently with the 
publication of The Problem of Social Cost (Coase, 1960) and became the basis of an 
entire research program in economics in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly with the 
publication of Oliver E. Williamson’s important article on transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1979; see also Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996, in particular ch. 3).  Most of 
that literature has focused on the business firm. 
The actors treated in The Problem of Social Cost are not agents inside the same 
firm, however.   For the most part, they are independent but adjacent or nearby land 
owners or other persons who have potentially conflicting interests in a legal entitlement.  
They can make joint resource allocations only by bargaining or, if bargaining fails, by 
litigating.  For example, the physician and confectioner in Sturges v. Bridgman, the 
subject of an extensive discussion in The Problem of Social Cost, owned houses on 
Wigmore and Walpole Streets in London that shared a party wall.  The physician 
complained that he could not listen to his stethoscope because of the pounding of the 
confectioner’s mortar and pestle.5 Sturges and Bridgman were not agents of the same 
firm or members of the same family.  They did not stand in a hierarchical relationship.  
They only way they could resolve their differences was by voluntary exchange or legal 
force.  But once again, other costs of moving resources must always be considered.  
Suppose Bridgman could at some cost move his mechanical mortar and pestle to a 
quieter room?  Or that Sturges could relocate his practice to another house down the 
street?  Their bargain will reflect these possibilities.  For example, if Bridgman can 
costlessy relocate his mortar and pestle in a way that solves the pounding problem and 
does his own business no harm, then even if physician Sturges would lose the nuisance 
suit he could pay Bridgman a small sum to effect the move. 
In sum, the Coasean analysis did not eliminate the Pigouvian notion of the cost 
of moving resources from consideration.  It merely folded those costs into the costs of 
reaching a bargain.  Indeed, bargaining is the way that independent parties determine 
whether the costs justify the movement.  If moving Bridgman’s mortar and pestle costs 
100 €, then he would not accept less than 100 € plus any costs he incurs from the 
bargaining itself as compensation for his move.  Or to say it differently, disregarding 
transaction costs, they will make the exchange under exactly the same circumstances 
                                            
5 Sturges vs. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879).  On the facts, see Coase, 1960, 1996; and Simpson, 
1996.  
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that a single firm that performed both services would redeploy the resources, which 
would be in a way that mazimized the firm’s value. 
The parties’ ability to reach a bargain in cases such as Sturges v. Bridgman tells 
us two things at the same time.  First, it tells us that quite aside from the costs of 
transacting the movement of resources is cost justified because if it were not the parties 
would not have the surplus to make the deal.6  Second, the fact that the deal is made 
tells us that the transaction costs in this case must have been sufficiently low to enable 
the bargain to be completed.  The cost of a bargain includes both the cost of moving the 
resources that the bargain contemplates and the cost of the bargaining itself.  The 
reason the “transaction” is necessary in The Problem of Social Cost is not because the 
cost of moving resources is irrelevant, but because the parties do not control each 
other’s behavior.  As a result, they both have to agree if the resources are to be moved. 
Coase wrote of his two most famous articles in 1988: 
Transaction costs were used in the one case [Nature of the Firm] to show that if 
they are not included in the analysis, the firm has no purpose, while in the other 
[Problem of Social Cost] I showed, as I thought, that if transaction costs were not 
introduced into the analysis, for the range of problems considered, the law had 
no purpose (Coase, 1988a, p. 34). 
But the fact is that the relevant costs cannot be limited to “transaction costs,” although 
clearly they must be included.  For example, even if bargaining were costless, a firm 
would still have boundaries to the extent that the value of its previously made 
investments and the (non-transaction) costs of switching them would determine the 
choice between internal production and external procurement.  The cost of moving 
resources “writ large,” in the Pigouvian sense, is always relevant. 
The Size of Coasean Markets 
At the time Sturges v. Bridgman was decided (1879) there were undoubtedly 
hundreds of physicians in London and also hundreds of confectioners selling in 
competition with each other.  There were probably also hundreds or thousands of 
houses that were suitable for either the practice of medicine or confectionery, and these 
were also sold or rented under competitive conditions.  If that were the case, then why 
would anyone care about this particular, quite idiosyncratic conflict? 
                                            
6 In Coasean terms the “surplus” is the difference between the buyer’s willingness to pay (WTP) and the 
seller’s willingness to accept (WTA).  A transaction occurs only if WTP > WTA, which will happen only if 
the cost of the resource movement itself plus the cost of transacting are less than the positive net value 
placed on the movement by the parties. 
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The answer is the cost of moving resources.  Even though London contains 
many physicians, many confectioners, and many places where these activities can be 
performed, these two parties are “forced” to bargain with each other to the extent that 
the cost of reaching a bargain is less than the cost of moving to a different house.   
Their previous investment has locked them into a situation from which extraction is 
more costly than reaching a resolution to their dispute.   As a result their little 
relationship is a market unto itself. 
 Coase recognized that, because markets are defined by the cost of moving 
resources, disputed legal entitlements can lead to the creation of very small markets 
that are worth contemplating, at least when the parties have established positions.  
Indeed, for the particular entitlement disputed by Sturges and Bridgman the only market 
participants are Sturges and Bridgman.  Coase was not the first to write about very 
small markets.  For example, F.Y. Edgeworth’s analysis of bilateral monopoly and the 
contract curve also dealt with two-person markets, as Coase acknowledged (Coase, 
1988d, pp. 160-161).  Edgeworth’s work was picked up by both Marshall and Pigou, 
who fretted over the problem of indeterminacy in bilateral monopoly markets 
(Hovenkamp 2010b).  Coase’s real contribution was to extend the analysis of bilateral 
monopoly to disputed legal entitlements, although without seriously addressing the 
indeterminacy issue.  The result was an extraordinary expansion of the study of bilateral 
monopoly to subjects such as contract law, divided estates in land, tortfeasor or criminal 
and victim, wife and husband, creditor and debtor, and many other legal disputes 
among pairs of individuals or interests (e.g. Posner, 2003). 
The delineation of a Coasean market depends on the same criteria as used to 
determine the scope of a Coasean business firm; namely, one must compare the 
marginal cost of doing something internally to the marginal cost of going outside.  If 
Bridgman is indifferent about the location of his confectionary and the cost of moving is 
zero, then he need not bargain with Sturges.  As a result, the question whether a 
Coasean bargaining outcome is efficient, or joint maximizing, rests entirely on the 
assumption that moving out is more costly than reaching a suitable bargain.  For 
example, if Sturges the physician has the more valuable property interest and the court 
correctly enjoins Bridgman’s mortar and pestle from operating, then the outcome is 
efficient if Bridgman cannot readily move elsewhere.  But if Bridgman can costlessly 
move to a less offensive site, then the efficient solution is for Bridgman to move and 
both will continue to operate.  More generally, if one party’s moving out creates a bigger 
surplus than any possible result from bargaining within, then that party will move out.   
This is another way of saying that the market in that particular situation cannot be 
limited to Sturges and Bridgman in their current locations.  In sum, the size of a 
Coasean market is precisely the same as the size of a firm encompassing the same 
activities. 
August, 2010 Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets    Page 16 
Equilibria in Coasean Markets 
If exchange is not hindered the agents within any market will trade until they have 
maximized aggregate value.7  This is true of all markets, including the Coasean variety.  
It is also true in a sense of business firms even though we ordinarily do not think of the 
principal/agent decision making process that occurs inside the firm as “bargaining.”  
Coase’s overall theme expressed in both The Nature of the Firm and The Problem of 
Social Cost is that groups of individuals with common and potentially conflicting 
interests will organize resources in a way that maximizes aggregate value.  Further, if 
the cost of reaching a bargain is high then some form of external arbiter might be 
necessary to induce the efficient result, and this arbiter is the legal system.  In such 
cases institutions have relevance. 
Coase’s claim that The Problem of Social Cost demonstrated why the law had a 
purpose depends on the idea that part of transaction costs is the cost of establishing 
ownership.  That proposition also applies to all markets, not merely those that show up 
in Coase’s writing. In most cases it is merely assumed.   Economics all the way back to 
Adam Smith and earlier recognized markets, and ownership rules were implicit in their 
recognition.  General equilibrium theorems such as the First Welfare Theorem simply 
assume that trading is costless and that ownership of the rights that are exchanged has 
been clearly defined.  Coase refocused the inquiry on ownership rules that are prone to 
ambiguity -- namely, property rights in a common law legal system that makes 
bargaining over them possible.  In sum, in a well functioning Coasean market, just as in 
any market, ownership rules are clear and other transaction costs are low. 
Coasean and neoclassical markets exhibit important differences and similarities.  
First, as previously indicated, Coasean markets are often much smaller than 
neoclassical markets.  The costs of substitution generally determine a market’s 
boundaries.  For example, the size of markets in competition law is determined by such 
things as transportation costs, asset specificity, consumer preference, or entry barriers -
- all phenomena that have to do with the cost of moving resources from one position to 
another in either geographic or product space (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2007).  Cosean 
markets can involve as few as two people (e.g., Sturges and Bridgman) or as many as 
several hundreds or thousands.  Who is in the market, and is thus forced to bargain, is 
determined mainly by comparing the costs of moving out against the costs and benefits 
of a value-maximizing allocation within.  Thus the factory with a polluting smokestack 
and 100 downwind homeowners may be a single Coasean market.8  Bargaining in the 
                                            
7 Coase considered and rejected Paul Samuelson’s suggestion that if one considers human beings as 
“social animals” it is quite possible that they would not reach a bargain, even if joint maximizing. ( See 
Coase, 1988d at 160-161, commenting on Samuelson, 1947, pp. 238, 251). 
8 E.g., Boomer vs. Atlantic Cement, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. 1970). 
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shadow of the law determines such decisions as whether the factory will be allowed to 
pollute at all, whether it must compensate the injured landowners and how much each 
should receive.  But the aggregation of factory plus homeowners is a market to begin 
with only because moving from inside to outside is costly. 
Another important difference between Coasean and neoclassical markets is that 
while a neoclassical market may have hundreds or thousands of sellers and as many or 
more buyers, only two are necessary to complete a transaction.  Indeed, if the market is 
competitive and imposes no externalities, other market participants will be indifferent 
when any two members complete a transaction, even though all are in the same 
market. 
By contrast, in the ordinary case involving a common law dispute Coasean 
markets require unanimity because all participants have an economic stake in the 
property interest that is subject to bargaining. The unanimity requirement in Coasean 
markets derives from two things.  One is the “reciprocal nature of the problem,” as 
Coase stated it (Coase, 1960, p. 2) and the other is the fact that a well functioning 
Coasean market contains no externalities – that is, everyone with a stake is invited to 
the table.  
For Coase, reciprocity was essential to avoid the problem of regarding one 
person as a wrongdoer and the other as a victim.  In fact, property rights conflicts are 
about inconsistent land uses and no one has an inherently superior right over someone 
else; the goal of the ideal system is to maximize value through bargaining.  “What 
answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is 
obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.” 
Second, externalities occur when someone is affected by a decision but not able 
to bargain about it.  A large portion of “The Problem of Social Cost” was devoted to a 
rejoinder to Pigou’s argument about externalities, which occur when one person’s action 
“renders services or disservices to other persons … of such a sort that payment cannot 
be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured 
parties.” (Coase, 1960, p. 28, quoting Pigou, 4th ed. 1932, p. 183).  Coase responded 
with a lengthy critique whose thrust was that if the “other persons” in Pigou’s statement 
could in fact be brought into the bargain the efficient outcome would occur without legal 
intervention unless transaction costs interfered.  If transaction costs were too high, then 
the legal system should assign the entitlement to the person who would have received it 
in a market in which transacting was costless (Coase, 1959, p. 29; and1960, pp. 28-39).  
In sum, Coase assumed that everyone with a stake participates in the bargain.  Indeed, 
that is the only assumption that can produce an efficient outcome.  For example, 
suppose the polluting smokestack injures 20 downwind landowners but because of the 
zoning laws or some other impediment only 15 are in a position to bargain.  In that case, 
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if the landowners are injured by 100€ each while the value of blowing smoke to the 
factory is 1800€, the smokestack will continue if only the 15 are in a position to bargain, 
but not if all 20 can.  That is, bargaining may be “non-unanimous” in the sense that not 
every affected person can be brought to the bargaining table.  But in Pigou’s 
nomenclature that would be an “externality,” and in Coase’s nomenclature it would be 
an instance of high transaction costs that interfered with an efficient bargain. 
The unanimity requirement is not a problem in the simplest cases, such as 
Sturges v. Bridgman, because they involve bilateral monopolies and every agreement is 
unanimous.  A bilateral monopoly can have an infinite number of equilibria because 
there is no single market price, and the result can be a great deal of negotiation before 
a trade is made (Blair and Harrison, 2010, pp.123-145; Posner, 2003, pp. 60-61, 117-
120).  When a Coasean market has more than two players solutions are even more 
elusive and can produce instability and “cycling.”   For example, suppose that a 
smokestack factory decides that it is guilty of an actionable nuisance and places 1000€ 
into an escrow account, telling the 100 downwind homeowners they can have it in 
exchange for a settlement agreement that all of them must sign. People with relatively 
small injuries will want equal payments to everyone; those that are closest to the 
smokestack will want a bigger share; those that are more in the wind’s usual path will 
want more; those with more valuable properties will want settlements in proportion to 
valuation, and so on.  The parties will form coalitions, and each offer will be answered 
by a counter-offer, a new formation of coalitions, in an endless cycle.  The problem has 
appeared in both the law of real covenants on land (Hovenkamp, 2002) and bankruptcy 
with multiple creditors (Baird & Rasmussen, 2010).  The result is not dissimilar to that 
which occurs in ordinary democratic voting, at least when transaction costs are not 
considered,9 where the ability of the collective to get a stable, welfare maximizing result 
is dubious (e.g., Arrow, 1963; Hovenkamp, 1990a; Levmore, 1999).  Indeed, one 
unintended message of Coasean analysis in markets involving large numbers of 
persons is that more rather than less government intervention may be necessary, both 
to determine liability in the first place and to determine how compensation is to be 
distributed among those who are entitled to it.10 
                                            
9 The Arrovian literature on democratic voting generally makes no assumptions about transaction costs, 
and thus its predictions of endless cycling must be qualified.  With positive transaction costs the cycle 
might in fact be broken.  However, outcomes could be Pareto inferior.  See Bernholz, 1997, 1999; Parisi, 
2003. 
10 Another problem of the Coasean efficiency analysis is that it implicitly depends on an assumption of 
constant marginal utility of wealth.  As a result it might work in the case of business firms, where one can 
assume that monetary wealth has constant utility, but not for natural persons, who are more likely to 
experience endowment effects. See Markovits, 2008; Hoffman & Spitzer, 1993; Hovenkamp, 1990 and 
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In his1959 essay on The Federal Communications Commission Coase 
recognized the problem of instability in Coasean markets with many players, using the 
smokestack example.  He also acknowledged  that such markets may require 
government intervention: 
The fact that actions might have harmful effects on others has been 
shown to be no obstacle to the introduction of property rights. But it was possible 
to reach this unequivocal result because the conflicts of interest were between 
individuals. When large numbers of people are involved, the argument for the 
institution of property rights is weakened and that for general regulations be-
comes stronger. The example commonly given by economists, again following 
Pigou, of a situation which calls for such regulation is that created by smoke 
pollution. Of course, if there were only one source of smoke and only one person 
were harmed, no new complication would be involved; it would not differ from the 
vibration case [Sturges v. Bridgman] discussed earlier. But if many people are 
harmed and there are several sources of pollution, it is more difficult to reach a 
satisfactory solution through the market. When the transfer of rights has to come 
about as a result of market transactions carried out between large numbers of 
people or organizations acting jointly, the process of negotiation may be so 
difficult and time-consuming as to make such transfers a practical impossibility…. 
As a practical matter, the market may become too costly to operate. 
In these circumstances it may be preferable to impose special 
regulations…. And, in principle, the solution to be sought is that which would 
have been achieved if the institution of private property and the pricing 
mechanism were working well…. (Coase, 1959, p. 29) 
 This passage was very largely ignored during the heyday of Coasean 
antiregulation scholarship.  Coase himself did not return to the issue in any systematic 
fashion.  At the same time, however, the passage also makes clear that Coase 
understood the problem of multi-party bargaining differently than it is understood today.  
For Coase, many parties made the bargaining process “difficult and time consuming,” 
making the market “too costly to operate.”  The problem is not that bargaining is costly 
and difficult, however, but rather that no equilibrium exists that is mutually satisfactory.  
Indeed, high bargaining costs may remedy rather than exacerbate the problem. 
The unanimity condition for Coasean markets has produced some confusion, 
possibly because the literature on markets with empty cores (i.e., where no Pareto 
optimal equilibrium is dictated by the market’s conditions) often references Coase (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                            
1991).  On the possible relationship between biological evolution and the endowment effect   see Jones 
and Brosnan, 2008. 
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Aivazian & Callen, 1981).  But not all markets with empty cores are Coasean markets.  
For example, suppose a town contains three taxicabs, each legally limited to carrying 
three passengers and required to charge a statutory fee of 30 € per trip.  There are ten 
passengers waiting at the airport for a ride into town and all ten are willing to pay an 
amount equal to or greater than one third of the fare.  Under fairly conventional 
assumptions each time a passenger is excluded from a particular deal she will be able 
to make a counter-offer to two other passengers under which they will break the existing 
coalition and form a new one.  For example, suppose nine passengers have agreed to 
pay 10 € each, or 30 € per trip.  Now the excluded passenger offers two other 
passengers that she will pay 12 €, leaving each of them to pay 9 € apiece.  The 
excluded passenger will then make a counter-offer, either to that cab or to one of the 
other two cabs, and so on, and so on (see, e.g., Telser, 1994).  This market is not 
Coasean, since unanimous consent is not required.  Rather, equilibrium fails because 
the “units” in which the service is sold and the number of customers who want one do 
not match, creating a kind of economic game of musical chairs.  Pigou recognized the 
problem already in the early 1930s, devoting an entire chapter of The Economics of 
Welfare to the problem of “Hindrances to Equality of Returns Due to Imperfect 
Divisibility of the Units in Terms of Which Transactions are Conducted.” (Pigou, 1936, 
II.vii. 1). 
In a case such as Sturges v. Bridgman a stable, nonempty core is obvious 
because the dispute has only two parties to begin with and any agreement among them 
would be unanimous.  In the case of the polluting smokestack and the 100 downwind 
homeowners unanimity is required because each home owner individually has a claim 
against the smokestack and they cannot be forced to settle against their will unless 
there is a prior agremeent.  One clear example of many-party Coasean markets 
requiring unanimous consent is private land use restrictions, where the ordinary 
common law rule is that a subdivision covenant cannot be imposed, amended or 
removed without the unanimous consent of the land owners.  To be sure, if the gainers 
from any resource movement gain more than losers will lose the gainers may be able to 
pay off the losers – that is, the change is potential Pareto efficient.  But that fact alone 
does not make the cycling problem go away.  There could still be an endless round of 
disputes about how much each payor must pay and how much each recipient will 
receive.  Private residential associations sometimes address this problem by permitting 
servitudes to be amended by a majority or a supermajority falling short of unanimity, but 
these can produce cycling problems as well and may even exacerbate them 
(Hovenkamp, 2002; see also Parisi, 2001).  Corporate law regimes also permit 
majorities (represented by number of shares) to control with less-than-unanimous votes.  
But that is so because the regime has a set of voting rules that are typically already in 
place when shares were purchased.  The default rule in a Coasean market – one that is 
defined by conflict over a legal entitlement – is always unanimous consent. 
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Consider once again the problem of Sturges and Bridgman, except this time 
assume that the building in question contains four offices in close proximity.  One is 
occupied by the noise making confectioner and the other three are all occupied by 
physicians A, B & C.  Suppose that the physicians value the right to be free of the noise 
by 10000 €, 9000 €, and 8000 € respectively, reflecting the differential values of their 
practices.  The confectioner values continuing operating of his machinery at 16000 €.  In 
this case if the noise constitutes a nuisance, entitling the physicians to an injunction, the 
situation has a stable outcome: the injunction will issue and the confectioner will not be 
able to buy off the physicians. 
But suppose that the law finds no nuisance and the noise will be stopped only if 
the physicians can pay off the confectioner.  They surely are able to do so under the 
Coasean analysis, because in the aggregate they value the right to practice medicine by 
more than the confectioner values the right to operate his equipment.  Suppose the 
confectioner indicates that he would accept an 18000 € settlement as a payment to shut 
down, and now the three physicians must agree on a division.  Physician A proposes 
equal payments of 6000 €.  Physicians C and perhaps B object.  They make a 
counterproposal that each of them will pay 4500 and physician A will pay 9000.  A 
objects and induces C into a coalition in which A will pay 8000, B will pay 6000, and C 
will pay 4000.  And so on, and so on.  The same thing applies in the reverse situation in 
which the value of the confectioner’s equipment is greater than the value of the three 
physician’s practices but the confectioner’s noise is found to be a nuisance.  The 
confectioner might then agree to pay a stated amount into an escrow account and enter 
a settlement, provided that the three physicians can agree on how to divide up the 
proceeds. 
Ironically, in such cases transaction costs may actually produce stability by 
making endless bargaining too costly (see, e.g., Aivazian & Callen, 1981; Mueller, 1989; 
Hovenkamp, 1993).  That is, the parties realize that there are gains to be made from 
bargaining, but they will be frittered away if costly bargaining goes on too long, just like 
the contested will in Bleak House, where litigation costs consumed the entire estate 
before the issues were ever resolved (Dickens, 1852-1853).  Coase himself at least 
implicitly suggested that transaction costs would force the parties to stop bargaining and 
reach a deal (Coase, 1981).11  
One forceful theme in the Coasean literature is that clarity of ownership is critical 
to private resolutions of legal disputes.  That is, property rights must be well defined 
(e.g., Simpson, 1996; Coleman, 1986).  However, the cycling problem does not go away 
                                            
11 For an inciteful analysis of the relationship between transaction costs and possibilities of cycling, see 
Aivazian and Callen, 2003, who note that transaction costs may not force an equilibrium and may in some 
cases even make the market less stable.. 
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when entitlements are well defined.  To the contrary, depending on the bargainers’ risk 
profiles uncertainty may actually induce them to reach an agreement rather than subject 
themselves to the uncertain results of a court decision.12  Indeed, difficulty in delineating 
property rights is often a rationale for the development of common interest communities, 
because the costs that attend sharing are less than the costs of resolving ownership 
disputes (e.g., Demsetz, 1967; Feeny, 1993; Ostrom, 2003a). 
Coase has never shared the general fascination of neoclassical economists with 
the technical conditions of equilibrium.  He appears simply to assume that the desire to 
maximize aggregate value is so great that participants will settle on joint maximizing 
solutions even when further individual gains from trading are possible.  For example, in 
response to one proof that certain Coasean markets had no “core” and would thus lead 
to an infinite cycle of offers and realignments, Coase responded that the parties could 
simply split the difference (Coase, 1981; critiqued in Telser, 1994 at 161).  Coase’s work 
has been repeatedly criticized for its failure to develop any theory of bargaining other 
than the naked assertion that if there are gains to be had from trading to a final resting 
point such trading will occur (See, e.g., Schwab, 1993; Regan, 1972; Cooter, 1982).  By 
contrast, the empirical literature on group management of common pools finds many 
cases of long-term failure (e.g., Ostrom, 1990, pp. 143-182). 
The possibility and social cost of instability and cycling must be regarded as 
substantial in the case of non-hierarchical disputes in Coasean markets.  By “non-
hierarchical” I mean situations where we cannot rely on a theory of management that 
reduces diverse interest holders to a single entity, as we do for the business firm.  In a 
world of zero transactions costs we will not get the efficient result, but rather endless 
higgling.  Perhaps as a result, some scholars have attempted to “rescue” the Coase 
Theorem by proposing variations – for example, that any contract once made be binding 
unless all parties agree to amend it (Bernholz, 1997, 1999; Parisi, 2003).13 
But typically the problem is to get the contract made in the first place.  Further, 
making the contract in advance often creates an opposite problem, namely excessive 
stability that prevents Coasean markets from responding to changing circumstances in 
the way that traditional market do.  Servitudes on real property provide a case in point.  
For example, once all of the members in a subdivision have agreed to a “residential use 
                                            
12 The literature on settlement generally assumes that clearly-defined legal rules are conducive to 
settlement.  E.g., Priest & Klein, 1984.  But the premise in such cases is that clarity produces a stable set 
of outcomes.  That does not necessarily hold true when the market does not have a stable equilibrium but 
multi-party bargining is necessary to achieve a settlement 
13 See also Parisi and Klick (2003), who argue that under a unanimity rule that permits side payments 
zero transaction costs would yield efficient outcomes, provided that once a side payment agreement was 
made it could not be violated. 
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only” restriction for all their lots, a single holdout can prevent the subdivision from 
moving to commercial uses even though surrounding circumstances make commercial 
uses preferable.14  In contrast, in traditional neoclassical markets participants can 
ordinarily trade and re-trade in response to changing conditions or tastes.  The same 
thing is true of democratic voting, as in a public zoning regime (Hovenkamp, 2002). 
When equilibrium fails transaction costs can have precisely the opposite effect 
that the Coasean literature generally suggests.  Without transaction costs people would 
keep contracting and re-contracting without end because any new offer could be made 
that seems superior to a decisive group over the previous offer.  As a result, some kind 
of outside intervention, such as the legal system, is necessary to stop the cycle.  By 
contrast, transaction costs make continued contracting and re-contracting costly.  As a 
result the parties are likely to reach a contractual equilibrium in order to preserve as 
much surplus as thay can.  The result is a kind of reverse Coase theorem: transaction 
costs make outside intervention less necessary by forcing a deal before the surplus is 
consumed. 
Thus one troublesome aspect of the Coasean cycling literature is that as the 
number of affected participants increases Coasean economic markets seem to lose 
their advantage over ordinary political markets in which each person gets one vote.  
Both seem equally prone to cycling and instability, thus tending to undermine the 
general Coasean argument for the superiority of contractual or common law approaches 
over legislative-regulatory approaches. 
Conclusion: Beyond Marginalism 
The topic of instability in Coasean markets has never produced anything like the 
volume of literature spawned by Coase’s Nature of the Firm or The Problem of Social 
Cost.  As a result the implications are not particularly well understood, although we can 
mention a few. 
First, the instability problem shows up when the default legal rule is “wrong” in 
the sense that the parties are required to bargain in order to get the maximizing result.  
For example, if the three physicians in the example given above collectively value their 
practices by a amount greater than the confectioner values his, then a court’s finding 
that the confectioner is guilty of a nuisance will not yield cycling.  The confectioner 
would have to make the payment and no offer he can make will be acceptable to the 
                                            
14In one well known case judicial intervention was required to relieve a subdivision from a 
restriction against the sale of alcoholic beverages that was nearly a century old and had long outlived its 
purpose.  El Di, Inc. v. Town of Bethany Beach, 477 A.2d 1066 (Del. 1984). 
,  
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three physicians.  They will never reach the point that they must negotiate over division 
of the proceeds.  Of course, the tribunal may not have good information about the 
values that the parties place on their interests.15  One advantage of settlement 
negotiations over judicial judgments is that bargaining parties presumably know their 
own value assessments better than any court would. 
Second, Coase’s conclusion (1960) that the initial assignment of property rights 
is important only when transaction costs are significant is incorrect.  If the Coasean 
market is inherently prone to cycling the initial assignment matters even when 
transaction costs are low.  Indeed, it may matter even more when they are low because 
when transacting is costly the parties will have a greater incentive to conclude their 
bargaining.  In those cases where settlements are necessary high transaction costs in 
the traditional Coasean analysis suggest that efficient settlements may not occur.  But 
low transaction costs suggest endless bargaining, which can also preclude efficient 
outcomes.  So efficient equilibria may be elusive either way.  This fact makes the legal 
system relevant in a larger range of cases than Coase believed, and in particular where 
the number of parties in a Coasean market is large. 
Third, cycling problems apply to bargaining situations such as the ones 
contemplated in The Problem of Social Cost, where the formation of a firm is not 
realistically an option, as Coase himself acknowledged (Coase, 1960, p. 16). This fact 
almost certainly explains why the Cosean literature on the business firm has been more 
successful and influential than the Coasean literature on bargaining behavior among 
independent actors.  Under perfect conditions both Coasean markets and firms 
maximize their value, but firms employ principal/agent hierarchies rather than markets.  
Hierarchies are able to do away with problems of differential interests and cycling, at 
least so long as we assume away agency costs, such as those occasioned by the 
separation of ownership and control.  The firm as it appears in both neoclassical 
economics and Coase’s Nature of the Firm is a unitary economic actor.  In the real 
world, of course, many firms have large numbers of shareholders and these may have 
conflicting ideas about the firm’s choices.  If they did not, then the institution of 
shareholder voting would undoubtedly have been abolished decades ago.  The 
separation of ownership and control may produce a divergence between what the firm’s 
managers want to do and the wishes of its diverse owners – divergences that continue 
to be prominent in the corporate law literature (e.g., Bebchuk & Kamar, 2010).  Indeed, 
                                            
15 Nuisance actions in the United States under the Second Restatement of Torts, §826a, suggest such an 
approach by finding a nuisance when “the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's 
conduct….”  But that is not to say that courts can readily make such determinations in close cases.  See, 
e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis.2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (remanding for determination under this 
standard when shadows cast by the nuisance defendant’s home interfered with the plaintiff’s solar energy 
system). 
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the separation of ownership and control became an obsession for the first generation of 
institutionalists, beginning with Thorstein Veblen’s critique of absentee ownership in 
1923, and culminating in Berle and Means The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932).  But the overwhelming thrust of both transaction cost economics and 
corporate finance theory has been to continue to treat the firm as a unitary economic 
actor, largely ignoring the possibly dissident views of shareholders (Hovenkamp, 
2009a). 
The very extensive work on the history and economics of private governance 
arrangements for common pool resources, such as fisheries or shared grazing land, 
sheds some light on the problem of equilibrium in Coasean markets.  In particular, such 
arrangements do not work all of the time (Ostrom, 1990 at pp. 143-181).   Secondly, a 
broader range of behavioral assumptions than pure neoclassical marginalism has been 
called upon to explain them.  The result is a form of institutionalist economic analysis 
that recalls the old institutionalism much more than the Williamson brand of New 
Institutional Economics (e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996). 
Most of the institutions created for the control of common pool resources are not 
treated by participants as Coasean markets.   Many do not require unanimous consent 
for decision making.  Indeed, many of these arrangements operate by a form of majority 
voting in which each person’s assertion of a preference is ranked equally.  The 
participants may vote directly on rules or they may elect a governing body to make the 
rules for them.  Many of these common pools end up being organized as “firms,” in the 
sense that the authority within them is hierarchical and the stated goal is to maximize 
the firm’s own value.  But some are also constructed more like governments with 
legislative power, and the governments are not always democratic (Ostrom, 1990, p. 
40-41; Ostrom, 1994, 267-282). 
Further, many of these rules for common pool resources have been in place for 
centuries.  They are certainly not based on any assumption that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are impossible or that market exchange is the only efficient form of 
communal resource allocation.  If there is a guiding principle to be found among the 
array of successful social systems for commons regulation it is that the goal is 
maximization of aggregate value.  This suggests a significantly increased role for 
notions of economic welfare that do not depend on Lord Robbins’  assumptions but 
rather on objective welfare judgments – that is judgments about prosperity or well-being 
that are based mainly on evolutionary or behavioral criteria (see Jones and Brosnan, 
2008; Hovenkamp, 1994).  It also suggests that in many cases legislation and executive 
control might be much more effective ways of managing communal property interests 
than pure private bargaining. 
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Coasean markets with many participants are a type of commons and present 
similar problems of collective governance.  For example, a residential subdivision of 
single-family homes may not own any land in common, but through a structure of 
covenants and other servitudes they do recognize and manage a set of common 
interests in real property use.  And indeed, for many residential subdivisions, including 
condominiums and others with multifamily structures, common ownership and 
management of land or buildings are present as well.  Further, even in the absence of 
servitudes the set of home owners who are downwind from a smokestack have a 
common interest that needs to be managed.  In this sense the air above a 100-home 
neighborhood is very much a common pool resource. 
What the literature on control of the commons recognizes, but what the Coasean 
literature too often ignores, is the extent to which human psychology and social 
evolution explain the emergence of stable equilibria.  In this regard the old 
institutionalists were right after all.  The mathematics of naked utility preferences without 
transaction costs inevitably leads to instability and cycling that show up in both the 
Coasean literature and the Condorcet/Arrow literature on political markets.  But human 
individuals have irremediable social as well as individual instincts for which marginal 
utility theory does not provide a satisfactory account.  The institutional tradition gives a 
much fuller representation of these economic behaviors (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1992, 
2005; Ellickson, 1991).  For example, the important work of Elinor Ostrom and others on 
the private governance of communal resources rests on a broader and richer set of 
behavioral assumptions than does marginalist economics.  Further, it is relentlessly both 
empirical and historical (e.g., Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 2005; see also Frey, 2010; McCabe, 
2003).  Because so many of the management decisions for commons property occur by 
mechanisms other than market exchange, broader Pigouvian ideas about the cost of 
moving resources seem much more relevant than the narrower Coasean conception of 
transaction costs.  At the same time, however, the markets recognized as relevant in 
analysis of commons resources are typically much smaller than neoclassical markets.  
For example, a village commons for grazing rights is the relevant market even though 
milk, beef or some other livestock product are sold in markets that are national or even 
larger. 
  To be sure, marginalism and bargaining have hardly lost their place; indeed, a 
great deal of the literature on commons management is based on game theory (e.g., 
Ostrom, et al, 2003b; Ostrom 1994).   Nevertheless, Ostrom’s recent recognition with 
the economics Nobel Prize is likely to be a major boost for behavioral economics.  Her 
book Understanding Institutional Diversity (Ostrom, 2005) is a call for a broader set of 
behavioral assumptions in the analysis of collective decision making in a wide variety of 
institutional contexts.  More than any recent winner of the economics Nobel Prize she 
has embraced a broad interdisciplinary approach that includes political, social and 
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biological sciences in addition to the naked marginalist-utilitarian assumptions that have 
become conventional in neoclassical economics. 
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